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35 Abstract 
36 
37 To interact with the world, we have to make sense of the continuous sensory input 
38 
39 conveying information about our environment.  A recent surge of studies has 
40 
41 investigated the processes enabling scene understanding, using increasingly complex 
42 
43 stimuli and sophisticated analyses to highlight the visual features and brain regions 
44 
45 involved.  However, there are two major challenges to producing a comprehensive 
46 
47 framework for scene understanding. First, scene perception is highly dynamic, 
48 
49 subserving multiple behavioral goals. Second, a multitude of different visual properties 
50 
51 co-occur across scenes and may be correlated or independent.  We synthesize the 
52 
53 recent literature and argue that for a complete view of scene understanding, it is 
54 
55 necessary to account for both differing observer goals and the contribution of diverse 
56 
57 scene properties. 
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4 Interacting with real-world scenes 
5 
6 
7 
8 Making a cup of tea is an easy task that requires minimal concentration, yet the 
9 
10 composition of behaviors involved is deceptively complex: recognizing the room next 
11 
12 door as a kitchen, navigating to it while manoeuvring around obstacles, locating and 
13 
14 handling objects (e.g., teabag, kettle), and manipulating those objects until they are in a 
15 
16 correct state (e.g., filling the kettle). In addition, it requires knowledge of relative 
17 
18 locations and future destinations within the environment (e.g., take the kettle to the 
19 
20 mug that is currently out of sight). Such interactions with the environment require the 
21 
22 selective processing of task-relevant information, as well as the continual storage and 
23 
24 retrieval of information from memory. Despite the seeming simplicity of the task, a 
25 
26 multitude of scene properties across a range of different dimensions need to be 
27 
28 processed, requiring the engagement of distributed brain regions. 
29 
30 
31 
The diversity of processes and goals engaged has led research on visual scene 
33 perception to progress in many directions over the past 50 years without necessarily 
35 much overlap. In the present article, we review this literature under the overarching 
36 
37 context of scene understanding (Box 1). We argue that such a broad perspective is 
38 
39 necessary to produce a comprehensive, theoretical framework to help elucidate the 
40 
41 underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms. In particular, we focus on four of the most 
42 
43 commonly studied behavioural goals – categorization, search, navigation and action – 
44 
45 and consider the natural overlap among scene properties and the neural mechanisms 
46 
47 involved. 
48 
49 
50 
51 Toward a Comprehensive Framework for Scene Understanding 
52 
53 
54 
55 There are two major challenges to producing a comprehensive theoretical framework 
56 
57 that would outline the cognitive and neural mechanisms of scene understanding. The 
58 
59 first is that while the physical characteristics of our surrounding environment are 
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4 generally stable, our immediate goals are not.  At any given moment, different visual 
5 
6 aspects of an environment will be prioritized based on our current goal (Figure 1A; see 
7 
8 also Box 2). However, the dynamic nature of scene understanding is often neglected as 
9 
10 studies typically focus on individual tasks. The diagnostic (see Glossary) scene properties 
11 
12 isolated in these studies may differ across task, making it hard to determine the extent 
13 
14 to which such findings generalize to scene understanding in the real world. 
15 
16 
17 
18 The second challenge arises from the complexity of the input. Any scene can be 
19 
20 described at multiple levels, from basic stimulus properties such as edges, spatial 
21 
22 frequency, and color, to more complex, high-level characteristics such as object identity, 
23 
24 spatial layout and action affordance (Figure 1B). Though individually each property 
25 
26 might predict a given behavior, their inherent co-occurrence across scene categories [1] 
27 
28 is often not considered: properties can either be correlated (e.g., beach scenes will 
29 generally contain large open spaces, far away objects, low spatial frequencies, etc.) or 
31 
independent (e.g. both city scenes and forests may be characterized by high spatial 
33 frequency, vertical edges, etc.). It is therefore difficult, and even potentially misguided, 
35 to tease out specific contributions of any individual property to scene understanding 
36 
37 without considering potential interactions. 
38 
39 
40 
41 These challenges are intimately linked: many different properties can be processed to 
42 
43 complete a single goal, and conversely a single property can be used to facilitate many 
44 
45 different goals. The diagnostic value of a visual property depends on a combination of 
46 
47 the current goal and prior experience of the observer, as well as its availability within 
48 
49 the scene and relationship to other properties [2,3]. In order to determine the cognitive 
50 
51 and neural processes enabling scene understanding, it is critical to clarify how observer 
52 
53 goals affect the weighting of different properties. In the next section, we will bring 
54 
55 together research that addresses four of the main goals of scene understanding, and 
56 
57 discuss how the potential utility of multiple properties varies across them. 
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34 
4 Goal 1: What is this scene? 
5 
6 Scenes can be categorized at varying levels of hierarchical detail. Relative to the basic 
7 
8 level, most commonly used in discourse (e.g., a city) [4], we can also make more 
9 
10 generalizable, superordinate judgments (the scene is outdoors), or more detailed, 
11 
12 subordinate judgments (a gothic city), or even identify the scene as a particular place (I 
13 
14 am approaching North Bridge, Edinburgh). Understanding the meaning of an 
15 
16 environment is important as it can facilitate the selection of subsequent behaviors such 
17 
18 as actions (approach a crosswalk), searching (the time can be found by looking at the 
19 
20 clock tower), deducing relative locations (the University is 10 minutes South), and so 
21 
22 on. 
23 
24 
25 
26 The most heavily researched concept in scene categorization is gist, the initial 
27 
28 representation of a scene that can be obtained in a brief glance. Studies typically make 
29 use of backwards-masking, or rapid serial visual presentation of, scene images and 
31 
record performance as a function of presentation duration (note that this does not 
33 necessarily reflect the timing of relevant brain processes [5]). A large body of work 
35 suggests that as little as a ~13ms presentation duration allows for an initial scene 
36 
37 percept [6], potentially including conceptual meaning [e.g., ,7] [but see ,8]. Though this 
38 
39 duration by itself has limited ecological validity compared to the gradually changing, 
40 
41 predictable world we experience, it serves as an important demonstration that an initial 
42 
43 conceptual representation of a scene requires only a small subset of available visual 
44 
45 properties to be processed.  This epoch is too short to make a saccade, so only a single 
46 
47 percept of a scene is afforded. 
48 
49 
50 
51 Global analysis of low-level features can facilitate the initial representation of a scene. 
52 
53 For example, spectral features [9] and summary statistics of local contrast [10] can 
54 
55 characterize the spatial properties of a scene: an efficient low-dimensionality resource 
56 
57 bypassing computationally expensive processes of recognizing and integrating local 
58 
59 components such as objects. Such global properties can accurately predict human scene 
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4 recognition performance [11] and are processed early enough to facilitate the gist 
5 
6 recognition epoch [12,13]. Other features include properties such as contour junctions 
7 
8 [14], and color [15,16], which can facilitate initial scene understanding, although 
9 
10 research suggests color facilitation occurs after initial processing of spatial structure 
11 
12 [17]. Furthermore, some higher-level object information is available very rapidly [18,19] 
13 
14 and objects and their co-occurrence may be diagnostic (e.g. the presence of a sink and 
15 
16 an oven are highly predictive that the scene is a kitchen) [20]. 
17 
18 
19 
20 While these properties and many more provide a quick summary of a scene’s meaning, 
21 
22 gist perception is limited for two reasons. First, interpreting the rapidly extracted gist 
23 
24 depends on stored representations of typically occurring patterns [21], developed over 
25 
26 experiences (e.g., a couch is commonly found in a living room). When scenes are less 
27 
28 typical, such as when they contain inconsistent objects [e.g., a boulder in a living room, 
29 ,3], or contain atypical action relationships between individuals [22], the scene requires 
31 
longer to process. Scene processing is therefore not entirely stimulus-driven, but is 
33 dependent on matching a percept to prior experiences. Secondly, scene recognition 
35 extends beyond gist, as we often interact with our environment at greater levels of 
36 
37 detail. The more detailed the judgment, the longer the scene needs to be examined 
38 
39 [23,24] as viewers supplement gist with goal-driven diagnostic details [2]. Thus, when 
40 
41 the scene is an infrequently experienced situation or does not provide enough 
42 
43 information relative to the viewer’s goal, additional information must be acquired. 
44 
45 
46 
47 Goal 2: Where is X? 
48 
49 To gain information beyond gist – whether to support detailed recognition, search, or 
50 
51 something else – eye movements are essential. This is necessitated by the retina’s 
52 
53 inhomogeneity: the central ~2 (fovea) of the visual field is processed in high resolution, 
54 
55 but acuity drops off in the surrounding parafoveal (~4.5 into the periphery) and 
56 
57 peripheral regions [25]. Appreciating the surrounding scene with full acuity would take 
58 
59 roughly 16 minutes for the fovea to be directed to each location in our environment 
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[26]. To overcome this limitation, the visual system directs eye movements in an 
efficient manner by integrating low-resolution peripheral information with the current 
goal and knowledge of the environment [27,28], constrained by eye movement 
tendencies that produce stereotypical scan patterns [29]. Information falling within the 
foveal or parafoveal regions is optimized for detailed processing, while information in 
the periphery informs efficient saccadic distribution [27]. 
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18 Several factors determine where the eyes are guided during scene viewing. Eye 
19 
20 movements are strongly biased to direct fixations toward objects instead of 
21 
22 backgrounds [30,31], with a preferred landing position within objects [32,33]. However, 
23 
24 determining which objects in a scene are fixated, in what order, and for how long, relies 
25 
26 heavily on the interplay between the viewer’s goals and available visual information. 
27 
28 When the viewer’s goal is non-specific (e.g., memorizing a scene), image-based 
29 properties can predict where people fixate: edge density, visual clutter and 
31 
homogenous segments predict fixation probability, while luminance and contrast play 
33 more minor roles [34]. The features used to select fixation sites are also determined by 
35 
distance from the previous fixation, with shorter saccades (<8) relying more on specific 
37 image features, particularly high-spatial frequencies, compared to longer saccades [35]. 
38 
39 Fixation locations in free-viewing tasks can also be predicted based on eye movement 
40 
41 tendencies, which act independently of the scene percept yet outperform some image- 
42 
43 based models in predicting fixation locations [29]. 
44 
45 
46 
47 When there is a more specific top-down goal (e.g., where is the kettle?) the visual 
48 
49 system can utilize various scene properties depending on how diagnostic they are for 
50 
51 that particular goal. Viewers might rely on matching low-level scene features, such as 
52 
53 color [36] or shape [37], with target properties. High-level factors can also bias gaze by 
54 
55 using the semantic relationship between gist and object meaning [38,39], as well as the 
56 
57 relationships between objects [31,40–42], the spatial dependency between objects [43] 
58 
59 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
or an object’s relationship to the spatial layout [44]. These various guidance factors can 
be combined to direct attention to the most likely target location [45,46, see Figure 2B]. 
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9 
10 Gaze allocation is thus the result of a bi-directional relationship between scene 
11 
12 properties, ranging from low-level features to high-level semantics, and the viewer’s 
13 
14 goal. However, as mentioned above, there is not necessarily a one-to-one mapping of 
15 
16 visual properties to a goal. The diagnosticity of a particular property is also dependent 
17 
18 on availability. Looking for a kettle in a kitchen would rely primarily on semantic 
19 
20 knowledge (e.g., kettles are typically found on the stove), yet if the scene does not 
21 
22 provide clear semantic cues, gaze guidance can be driven by episodic memory instead 
23 
24 [e.g., where did I last see the kettle?, ,47]. Similarly, if the target has no specific spatial 
25 
26 dependency, other factors dominate [48]: searching for a fly would rely on low-level 
27 
28 feature matching; looking for a banana in a well-lit room would primarily rely on color, 
29 while in the same dimly lit room it would rely more on shape. 
31 
32 
33 Additionally, as the representation of a scene changes over time, so too does the 
35 information gathered by eye movements.  Once recognized, the scene category rarely 
36 
37 changes without significant locomotion from the viewer; thus gist becomes a less 
38 
39 relevant guiding factor over time [49,50] and other properties become more pertinent – 
40 
41 e.g., fixated objects stored in short- and long-term memory [51–53] – enabling the 
42 
43 development of more detailed scene representations [2], improved action efficiency 
44 
45 [54,55], and so forth. 
46 
47 
48 
49 Goal 3: How do I get from A to B? 
50 
51 Accomplishing a particular goal may require moving from one location to another [e.g., 
52 
53 ,56,57].  Scene understanding therefore not only entails what a scene is or where 
54 
55 specific scene elements are, but also involves representing the information that enables 
56 
57 navigation through them. 
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We discuss two forms of navigation here.  The first is how we move from one point to 
another in vista space [58], which we refer to here as navigability, and is generally 
concerned with paths and obstacles [11]: for instance, crossing from one side of North 
Bridge to the other while avoiding buses. This relies on a dynamic representation of our 
position within a stable spatial layout, and prioritizes updating the location and 
movement of discrete objects more than their meaning. Clear paths and obstacles can 
potentially be processed from the same global properties that facilitate the initial 
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17 
18 labelling of a scene through spatial characteristics [11,12]. As observers move through 
19 
20 the world, they can regularly update their spatial location and continue to sample 
21 
22 information concerning the state and position of obstacles. For instance, some of the 
23 
24 most commonly fixated obstacles when moving through an environment are people 
25 
26 [59], who are generally fixated at a distance to determine their heading and avoid 
27 
28 collisions [55,59]. Similarly, eye movements are made to gauge the distance of 
29 approaching objects [e.g., a car, ,60]. Viewers also sample ground information in a goal- 
31 
driven manner, directing fixations ahead to check for changing terrain, as well as to 
33 closer regions that will be stepped on, and surface transitions to avoid [e.g., a curb, ,61]. 
35 
36 
37 The second form of position-based scene understanding is knowing where you are 
38 
39 relative to an unseen location in environmental space [58], which we refer to here as 
40 
41 navigation. For example, identifying your location as on North Bridge, Edinburgh, and 
42 
43 knowing your relative direction and distance from the University.  Navigation relies 
44 
45 more on the meaning of a scene and less on the dynamic position of its elements. An 
46 
47 observer’s position during navigation can be discerned from a process relying on path- 
48 
49 integration – the integration of an observer’s translations and rotations from a start 
50 
51 point in order to estimate the current position [62] – working in concert with two 
52 
53 informative scene properties.  The first is landmarks, which are persistent visual stimuli 
54 
55 that have both distinct perceptual features and occur at decision points along a route 
56 
57 [63–65]. Three types of information are needed to utilize a landmark: it needs to be 
58 
59 recognized (e.g., clock tower), its position relative to other points needs to be retrieved 
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from long-term spatial knowledge (e.g., the clock tower is six blocks from the 
University), and the heading of the viewer relative to the landmark needs to be 
determined (e.g., the clock tower is in front of me). At this point a route can be planned 
[e.g., carry on straight ahead, ,66]. The second informative property is scene 
boundaries, which are extended surfaces that separate one environment from another. 
Unlike the single point of a landmark, boundaries are made up of multiple points from 
which directions can be discerned [67]. Though typically thought of as large structures 
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Navigation can be seen as one example of a behavioral goal that highlights the strong 
link between vision and action in scene understanding. This functional perspective on 
vision was long ago recognized in theoretical frameworks emphasizing scenes as 
environments that provide possibilities for action, i.e. ‘affordances’ [4,71]. Action 
affordance has shown to be an important factor in how we understand objects [72], and 
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18 (e.g., walls), a boundary need not necessarily restrict movement and even a subtle 
19 
20 geometric property – such as a small ridge – is enough to act as an informative spatial 
21 
22 cue [68]. The relative contributions of landmarks and boundaries to navigation can be 
23 
24 directly compared using a virtual arena paradigm, in which target location is tethered to 
25 
26 a landmark or boundary which participants learn over time [e.g., ,69,70, see Figure 2C]. 
27 
28 
29 
Locomotion through an environment is experienced as continuous episodes of 
31 
immediate spaces (walk across the bridge, down the street, around the corner, etc.). 
33 Thus, more than recognition or searching for items, the behavioral goal of movement is 
35 made up of a sequence of smaller goals. At each new stage, the internal scene 
36 
37 representation must change with the observer’s needs, whether it is a decision based 
38 
39 more on physical locations in vista space (e.g., head to the gap between obstacles), or 
40 
41 recognition in environmental space (e.g., recognize the landmark and interpret 
42 
43 location), or the two simultaneously. As such, navigation is an ecologically relevant 
44 
45 behavioral goal that emphasizes the dynamic nature of scene understanding. 
46 
47 
48 
49 Goal 4: What can I do here? 
1 
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17 
object affordance influences how we search for items in visual scenes [73]. While 
several studies have considered how visual scenes serve as a context facilitating 
recognition of both objects [18,74–76] and actions [77], the idea that affordances 
determine how we understand the scene itself is relatively unexplored. However, a 
recent study has shown that descriptions of actions which might occur in a scene predict 
their categorization better than objects or visual features. In other words, a kitchen 
scene is understood as a kitchen “because it is a space that affords cooking” [78, p93] 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Based on the discussion of these four main goals of scene understanding, it should be 
clear that the goals themselves are not mutually exclusive. For example, recognition 
facilitates search and navigation processes; navigation sometimes requires searching for 
10 
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18 (Figure 2D). 
19 
20 
21 
22 An unresolved question is how such action affordances might be computed from a 
23 
24 scene. While action descriptions explained most of the variance in the behavioral 
25 
26 categorization [78], some of this variance was shared with objects and visual features. 
27 
28 Presumably, action affordances can be deduced from a scene by a non-linear 
29 combination of multiple scene properties, which may include those depicted in Figure 
31 
1B, as well as representations stored in memory, potentially including complex 
33 sociocultural aspects of scenes [79]. Another novel line of research suggests that our 
35 ability to make physical inferences about our visual environment, e.g., predict possible 
36 
37 movements by objects in scenes [80], involves cognitive mechanisms also used in action 
38 
39 planning [81]. As such, the concept of action affordances highlights the importance of 
40 
41 considering multiple scene properties simultaneously, allowing for potential 
42 
43 combination of these properties with action goals. Generally speaking, action 
44 
45 affordances could serve as a useful broader concept highlighting the interactive 
46 
47 components of scene understanding, and encompassing more complex functional scene 
48 
49 properties such as navigability, which ‘afford’ movement within a space. 
50 
51 
52 
53 Mapping Properties to Goals 
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specific information (e.g. objects, boundaries); scene affordance must consider 
navigability within a space, and so forth.  Similarly, informative properties overlap 
various goals: spatial layout facilitates the early stages of recognition as well as 
navigability, edge information can help recognition and obstacle detection, etc. This 
means that there is no simple way to map between goals and properties. In this context, 
elucidating the neural mechanisms of scene processing can provide additional insight by 
demonstrating which properties are represented in different parts of the brain. 
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18 
19 
20 The Neural Mechanisms of Scene Understanding 
21 
22 In general, visual scene processing in humans has been characterized by a trio of scene- 
23 
24 selective regions: occipital place area (OPA), parahippocampal place area (PPA) and 
25 
26 retrosplenial complex (RSC), on the lateral occipital, ventral temporal and medial 
27 
28 parietal cortical surfaces, respectively [82]. Studies in non-human primates have also 
29 reported scene-selective regions [83–85] as well as regions responsive to spatial 
31 
landscapes [86]. Much of the research on humans has focused on establishing what 
33 specific properties each scene-selective region is sensitive to. For example, responses in 
35 PPA have been reported to reflect a wide range of properties, including, i) low-level 
36 
37 properties, such as spatial frequency [87–90], orientation [91], texture [92], 
38 
39 rectilinearity [93] [, but see ,94], and contour junctions [95]; ii) object properties, such as 
40 
41 identity [96], size [97], space diagnosticity [98], co-occurrence [99], and object 
42 
43 ensembles [92]; iii) 3D layout, such as size of a space [100], spatial expanse [i.e., open or 
44 
45 closed, ,96,101,102], distance [102], and boundaries [103]; and iv) high-level properties, 
46 
47 such as semantic category [104,105], contextual associations [106,107], and knowledge 
48 
49 of scene correspondences [108]. Sensitivity to some of these properties is shared by 
50 
51 both OPA and RSC, but in contrast to PPA, they show greater sensitivity to egocentric 
52 
53 distance [109] and sense [i.e., left versus right mirror views, ,110]. Further, OPA has 
54 
55 been associated with the local elements of scenes [111] and transcranial magnetic 
56 
57 stimulation over OPA selectively impairs scene discrimination and categorization [112], 
58 
59 as well as disrupting navigation relative to boundaries [70, Figure 2C]. RSC may have a 
1 
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particular sensitivity to landmarks [64,113,114], and, in addition to visual 
responsiveness, RSC (and to some extent anterior PPA) has been associated with spatial 
memory and imagery, particularly in the context of navigation [108,115–117]. In fact, 
there may be separate perceptual and memory scene networks [118,119] and 
systematic organization [e.g., ,95,99] within medial parietal cortex, with posterior 
regions showing more visual selectivity and anterior regions more related to memory 
[120]. Finally, there are basic response characteristics of the three scene-selective 
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30 
34 
18 regions that may help inform their functional role and the critical scene properties they 
19 
20 represent. In particular, these regions show a peripheral visual field bias with relatively 
21 
22 large population receptive fields that make them well placed to capture summary 
23 
24 information across large portions of the field of view [120–122]. Further, OPA and PPA 
25 
26 show retinotopic biases to the lower and upper visual field, that may make them 
27 
28 particularly well suited for capturing information relevant for navigability or processing 
29 landmarks, respectively [121]. 
31 
32 
33 While these studies have provided much insight into the neural processing of scenes, it 
35 is clear that each region is sensitive to multiple scene properties and determining 
36 
37 specific critical properties for each region is difficult. In part, this may reflect the two 
38 
39 challenges we have highlighted. First, most studies have focused on individual tasks 
40 
41 only, and their results may be specific to that task. Indeed, a recent study [123] carefully 
42 
43 and systematically manipulated multiple features of computer-generated scenes and 
44 
45 compared brain representation of these features across multiple tasks revealing 
46 
47 dynamic coding of scene properties (Figure 3A). For example, differentiation of spatial 
48 
49 boundary in PPA was affected by a task instruction requiring participants to attend to 
50 
51 either texture or spatial layout. Task effects have also been reported to change 
52 
53 sensitivity to diagnostic properties in EEG signals for real-world scenes [124]. 
54 
55 
56 
57 Second, the different properties identified in different studies may in fact be correlated, 
58 
59 and reflect sensitivity to the same underlying dimension. One approach to address this 
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4 problem is to use large numbers of naturalistic images and model multiple dimensions 
5 
6 simultaneously. For example, a comprehensive analysis [125; Figure 3B] revealed that 
7 
8 the dimensions of spatial frequency, subjective distance and object category all 
9 
10 explained variance in scene-selective regions. However, most of the variance explained 
11 
12 was shared across the models suggesting that, for example, the apparent sensitivity to 
13 
14 scene category could just as easily be interpreted as reflecting differences in spatial 
15 
16 frequency. The difficulty of this approach, however, is that there are many possible 
17 
18 models that could be tested. Further, these models might differ in their biological 
19 
20 plausibility (see Box 3) and we should also be careful not to assume that any sensitivity 
21 
22 to low level properties explains away the sensitivity to high level properties - the 
23 
24 interaction between low and high level features may actually be informative about how 
25 
26 the brains transforms the retinal input into a task-relevant representation [126]. 
27 
28 
29 
Despite the many goals of scene understanding, many of the neuroimaging studies we 
31 
have discussed emphasize recognition or use simple tasks not necessarily related to 
33 real-world goals such as passive fixation [e.g., ,95,99], orthogonal tasks [e.g., changes in 
35 the fixation cross, ,102], simple discrimination [e.g., 1-back repetition, ,100,111], or 
36 
37 familiarity judgments [108]. The major exceptions are the increasing number of studies 
38 
39 that focus on navigation [e.g., ,108,113] and such an approach is necessary to help 
40 
41 elucidate the neural mechanisms of scene understanding. The distinction we have 
42 
43 highlighted between recognition and interaction is reminiscent of the division of cortical 
44 
45 visual processing into dorsal and ventral pathways which have been characterized as 
46 
47 reflecting separate processing of dynamic spatiotemporal relationships and stable visual 
48 
49 qualities, respectively [127]. However, the role of the dorsal pathway in scene 
50 
51 understanding has been relatively little explored and, navigation aside, there has been 
52 
53 little focus on more immediate interactions with the environment such as guidance of 
54 
55 eye movements in scenes, which might depend heavily on the dorsal pathway. 
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34 
4 Moving forward, we suggest that to build on the current literature and further elucidate 
5 
6 the neural mechanisms underlying scene understanding research should continue to 
7 
8 emphasize: the use of naturalistic images (reflecting the diverse properties and their 
9 
10 correlations in real-world scenes), meaningful tasks (that reflect real world goals), 
11 
12 generalizability across tasks, simultaneous consideration of multiple scene properties 
13 
14 (avoiding a priori assumptions about specific properties) and an understanding of how 
15 
16 those scene properties relate to each other. While integrating all these elements 
17 
18 together is certainly ambitious, we believe it paves the way forward for elucidating the 
19 
20 neural representation of scenes. 
21 
22 
23 
24 Concluding Remarks and Future Directions 
25 
26 Scene understanding entails representing information about the properties and 
27 
28 arrangement of the world to facilitate ongoing needs of the viewer. By focusing on four 
29 major goals of scene understanding – recognizing the environment, searching for 
31 
information within the environment, moving through the environment, and determining 
33 what actions can be performed – we have demonstrated how different goals use similar 
35 properties and, conversely, how many properties can be used for different goals. 
36 
37 Further, the brain regions implicated in scene processing appear to represent multiple 
38 
39 different properties and might be capable of supporting multiple goals. While studying 
40 
41 single tasks and the contribution of isolated properties has elucidated important sub- 
42 
43 components of scene understanding, we advocate a more comprehensive scene 
44 
45 understanding framework. Allowing for dynamic representation of multiple scene 
46 
47 properties across multiple tasks opens up many exciting new research questions (see 
48 
49 Outstanding Questions) for which experiments will be required that combine strong, 
50 
51 hypothesis-driven manipulations of top-down goals with sophisticated, data-driven 
52 
53 measurements of scene properties. While it is challenging to adopt real-world goals for 
54 
55 experimentation in a laboratory setting, we believe that as a whole, the research 
56 
57 community has developed the tools enabling the power of multiple approaches to be 
58 
59 combined in order to help understand how we make sense of real-world scenes. 
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41 
43 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Box 1: Scene Understanding 
9 
10 
Text Boxes 
11 There is no single way to define a scene, and previous work has often focused on two 
13 key considerations [e.g. ,82,6,128]. The first consideration is primarily stimulus-based, 
14 
15 focusing on the perceived properties of an image. Very generally, any collection of 
16 
17 objects or shapes (e.g. a texture, or an array of search items) can be considered a scene. 
18 
19 However, real-world scenes differ from such stimuli because they typically contain a 
20 
21 large variety of items that are arranged in a meaningful manner, containing a spatial 
22 
23 layout that organizes the scene into foreground objects and background elements (e.g., 
24 
25 walls, ground plane). As such, a scene is often defined as consisting of a specific 
26 
27 viewpoint of a real-world environment (e.g. a beach photograph). Such stimulus-based 
28 
29 definitions are most commonly adopted in studies on scene recognition and 
30 
31 categorization. To the extent that these tasks require processing an image as a single 
32 
33 nameable entity, one could argue that processing of a scene stimulus is not unlike 
34 
35 processing an object. However, an important second distinction that has been made is 
36 
37 that observers act upon objects but act within scenes [82,6]. In this light, the second way 
38 
39 we can consider scenes is as a 3D environment the observer is embedded in and 
40 interacts with. Under this interaction-based view, those aspects of a scene allowing the 
42 
observer to carry out specific behavioural goals, e.g. locomotion or motor interaction, 
44 become critical. Daily tasks are generally comprised of several smaller goals occurring in 
45 
46 quick succession, or potentially overlapping in time, while the world gradually unfolds 
47 
48 around us. The interaction-based view on scenes thus incorporates not only what is 
49 
50 visible, but also the memorized (or predicted) arrangement of elements that are 
51 
52 involved in a larger, continuous environment. 
53 
54 
55 
56 These considerations are not mutually exclusive: many of the visual properties identified 
57 
58 under the scene-as-stimulus view are relevant for interacting with scenes, and in turn 
59 
60 individual behavioural goals that involve interaction with scenes may require the 
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4 representation of different scene properties. The framework we propose explicitly 
5 
6 incorporates both of these considerations under the umbrella term of “scene 
7 
8 understanding”, which emphasizes both how individual goals affect one another and the 
9 
10 respective weighting of visual properties. 
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33 
34 
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39 
40 
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34 
4 Box 2: Goal driven models of visual processing 
5 
6 
7 
8 The importance of ethological goals has been emphasized in computational work 
9 
10 employing hierarchical convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [129]. These models, 
11 
12 which in essence are a generalized form of principles first proposed by Hubel and 
13 
14 Wiesel, have garnered increasing attention because they approach human levels of 
15 
16 performance on tasks such as object recognition for real-world images [129,130] and 
17 
18 show a degree of correspondence between individual layers of the networks and 
19 
20 different levels of neural visual object processing [131–133]. CNNs that perform better 
21 
22 on object-recognition tasks are found to be better predictors of neuronal spiking data in 
23 
24 monkey inferotemporal cortex [134], suggesting the importance of a goal driven 
25 
26 approach for creating  a model of a given sensory system. Although CNNs have primarily 
27 
28 been trained on object recognition tasks, some have focused on scene categorization 
29 [135], also revealing a correspondence to human MEG data [136]. Importantly, 
31 
performance on scene-related recognition tasks was found to be better for a network 
33 trained on scene-centric compared to one trained on object-centric data [137]. Further, 
35 the estimated receptive fields of a scene network appeared to exhibit features 
36 
37 consistent with properties such as surface layout, and comparison with an object 
38 
39 network showed stronger representational similarity with scene size [136]. 
40 
41 
42 
43 While we have so far emphasized the importance of the task goal in training CNNs, this 
44 
45 is not to say that there is no generalization, that the features developed for one task are 
46 
47 not also applicable to other tasks. For example, a CNN optimized for object classification 
48 
49 showed some generalization to other recognition tasks such as attribute detection (e.g. 
50 
51 presence of specific part or material) and scene recognition [138]. Similarly, a CNN 
52 
53 trained to perform scene categorization appeared to develop object detectors [137]. An 
54 
55 issue that is so far unexplored is whether the degree to which CNNs trained for different 
56 
57 tasks develop similar feature representations depends on the inherent correlations in 
58 
59 the visual input (Figure 1B), i.e. whether generalization across tasks may occur because 
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4 of shared information between features in the real-world. One possibility suggested by 
5 
6 findings from CNNs is that different processing pathways in the brain could have 
7 
8 developed as a direct result of the differential task constraints imposed by the required 
9 
10 classification of the respective visual input [127,134,136]. 
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4 Box 3: Biological plausibility of scene properties 
5 
6 
7 
8 An important factor to consider when comparing multiple models of scene properties is 
9 
10 whether and how these properties can be computed plausibly by the visual system. One 
11 
12 example highlighting this issue is the role of spatial frequency in visual scene perception. 
13 
14 In the influential Spatial Envelope model [9], spatial frequency regularities of scenes are 
15 
16 quantified based on principal components of their power spectra. However, it has long 
17 
18 been recognized that the brain cannot perform a computation akin to a whole-scene 
19 
20 Fourier transformation necessary to derive the principal components [139,140]. Visual 
21 
22 processing in the brain occurs via conversion of light intensities at the retina to local 
23 
24 contrast responses in small receptive fields in the lateral geniculate nucleus and primary 
25 
26 visual cortex: neurons in these areas thus only “see” a small part of the visual scene. 
27 
28 While higher-order visual regions have larger receptive fields (which are thought to 
29 integrate the information being fed from preceding regions), recent reports of extensive 
31 
retinotopic biases in high-level, category-selective regions [e.g., ,122] question the idea 
33 these areas are capable of representing whole-scene information. Importantly, some 
35 global scene properties reflected in the spatial frequency decomposition, such as 
36 
37 naturalness, are also reflected in the local contrast distribution, which thus potentially 
38 
39 forms a more biologically plausible image statistic that can be computed across a 
40 
41 selected portion of the visual field [10,141]. Direct comparison of statistics derived from 
42 
43 the Fourier transform versus the local contrast distribution has shown that the latter 
44 
45 better predicts visual evoked responses in humans to natural scenes [13,142]. 
46 
47 
48 
49 This issue is also relevant considering that the Fourier transformation is commonly used 
50 
51 in cognitive neuroscience experiments as an image manipulation tool, e.g. to 
52 
53 demonstrate spatial frequency biases in higher-order visual regions with filtered stimuli 
54 
55 that contain exclusively high or low spatial frequencies [e.g., ,143].  However, brain 
56 
57 responses obtained using manipulated images do not necessarily generalize to intact 
58 
59 natural scenes [144,145], and it is important not to attribute the operation performed 
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4 to achieve an image manipulation to a neural computation without considering its 
5 
6 biological plausibility. Instead, it might be more useful to think of image manipulation as 
7 
8 emphasizing specific aspects that are more or less diagnostic for a given task [146,147]. 
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30 
32 
4 Glossary 
5 
6 Convolutional Neural Network: A computer vision model with a multi-layer architecture 
7 
8 performing hierarchical computations that can be trained to perform classification of 
9 
10 visual images. 
11 
12 
13 
14 Diagnosticity: The relative usefulness of a specific subset of perceptual information in 
15 
16 facilitating an observer’s goal. For example, an oven is highly diagnostic in helping to 
17 
18 categorize a scene as a kitchen, while an apple is less so. 
19 
20 
21 
22 Environmental Space: A physical space that is too large to be appreciated without 
23 
24 locomotion, requiring the integration of information over time. Examples include 
25 
26 buildings, neighborhoods, golf courses, etc. 
27 
28 
29 
Fixation: A period of relative eye movement stability, usually on an object so that its 
31 
image falls on the fovea, allowing for the perception of local details. 
33 
34 
35 Gist: The perceptual and semantic information comprehended in a single glance of a 
36 
37 scene (generally ranging from 13-250ms in presentation duration).  The content of gist 
38 
39 usually includes a conceptual understanding of a scene (e.g., birthday party), the spatial 
40 
41 layout of the environment, and recognizing a few objects. 
42 
43 
44 
45 Saccade: A ballistic eye movement that quickly moves the fovea from one fixated 
46 
47 location to another.  The eyes rotate up to speeds of 500 per second, and no visual 
48 
49 information is extracted during this time. 
50 
51 
52 
53 Scene Selectivity: By comparing the response elicited by visually presented scenes with 
54 
55 that for objects or faces, researchers have identified three scene-selective cortical 
56 
57 regions, termed the parahippocampal place area, the occipital place area, and the 
58 
59 retrosplenial complex. 
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4 
5 
6 Spatial Frequency: A measure of how often sinusoidal components of image structure 
7 
8 repeat across units of distance, which captures the level of detail present in a scene per 
9 
10 degree of visual angle. A scene with small details and sharp edges contains more high 
11 
12 spatial frequency information than one composed of large coarse stimuli. 
13 
14 
15 
16 Vista Space: A physical space that can be viewed in its entirety from a single location 
17 
18 without locomotion.  Examples include a classroom, town square, field, etc. 
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4 Figures 
5 
6 
7 
8 Figure 1. Observer goals and scene properties. A) Examples of possible observer goals 
9 
10 in scene understanding. In this article, we focus on four general task domains that 
11 
12 involve scene understanding: 1) recognition, i.e. determining whether a visual scene 
13 
14 belongs to a certain category (e.g., beach scene), or depicts a particular place (the park, 
15 
16 my living room); 2) visual search, which involves locating specific objects or other scene 
17 
18 elements; 3) navigation, which involves determining both the navigability of the 
19 
20 immediate space and one’s position relative to an unseen location; and 4) action goals, 
21 
22 which may involve navigation but also encompass a broader set of activities such as 
23 
24 cooking or playing baseball. B) Examples of scene properties that may be relevant for 
25 
26 constructing mental representations necessary to achieve various observer goals. 
27 
28 Properties that can be computed from scene images with relatively simple 
29 computational models, such as edges, spatial frequency and color, are considered ‘low- 
31 
level features’. More complex properties are the scene’s constituent objects and 3D 
33 properties reflective of the layout of the scene, or the distance of the observer to salient 
35 elements in scenes. Finally, semantic category and action affordances can be seen as 
36 
37 ‘high-level’ features of scenes that are not easily computed from scenes but may inform 
38 
39 multiple observer goals. Note that scenes may differ from one another at multiple 
40 
41 levels; for example, the beach scene can be distinguished from the park and living room 
42 
43 based on virtually all dimensions, whereas the park and living room image share some 
44 
45 but not all properties. Due to the inherent correlations between scene features, 
46 
47 assessing their individual contributions to scene representations is challenging [125]. 
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Figure 2. Mapping properties to goals. A) Recognizing a scene. Scenes that were easily 
categorized as man-made or natural resided at opposite ends of a low-level feature 
space described by two summary statistics of local contrast (see Box 3): contrast energy 
and spatial coherence, while ambiguous scenes were found in the middle of the space. 
These statistics also modulate evoked EEG responses in early stages of visual processing. 
Redrawn from data published in [13]. B) Locating information within a scene. Fixation 
density heat map during a visual search task. Participants combined precise search 
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17 
18 templates (object image, bottom row) and reliable spatial expectations (normal vs. 
19 
20 switched arrangements, columns) to improve oculomotor efficiency. Reproduced, with 
21 
22 permission, from [46]. C) Navigating through scenes. A virtual arena paradigm used to 
23 
24 test contributions of landmark and boundary information. Participants learn target 
25 
26 locations, which are tethered to a boundary or landmark location. Disruption of OPA 
27 
28 with transcranial magnetic stimulation affected navigation with respect to boundaries 
29 but not with respect to landmarks. Modified with permission from [70]. D) Actions 
31 
afforded by a scene. An empirically derived scene function feature space (containing, for 
33 example, a dimension separating solitary outdoor activities from social indoor activities) 
35 correlated more strongly with scene categorization behaviour than various other models 
36 
37 of scene properties, including object labels, CNN representations, and low-level feature 
38 
39 models. The variance explained by the function space was partly unique and partly 
40 
41 shared with the other models. Modified, with permission, from [78]. 
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Figure 3. Investigating multiple properties and goals. A) Dynamic coding of scene 
properties. Four different scene categories were created by systematically varying 
spatial boundary (open vs. closed) and scene content (natural vs. manufactured), and 
each category contained twelve unique structural layouts and twelve textures. Both 
scene content and a task manipulation (attend to layout or texture) modulated whether 
spatial boundary could be decoded from fMRI responses across multiple scene-selective 
areas. Modified, with permission, from [123]. B) Correlations between scene properties. 
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34 
18 Three models of scene properties were compared in terms of their inter-correlations 
19 
20 and ability to predict fMRI responses in scene-selective cortex: 1) Fourier power at four 
21 
22 major orientations, subdivided in low versus high frequencies, as well as a total energy 
23 
24 measure; 2) Subjective distance to salient objects in the scene, divided in five different 
25 
26 bins; and 3) Object labels, binned in 19 categories. Dashed white outlines indicate an 
27 
28 example of high feature correlation between models: pictures containing sky tend to 
29 have far distance ratings and relatively high spatial frequency in the horizontal 
31 
dimension, potentially due to the presence of a thin horizon line and tiny objects in 
33 faraway scenes (e.g., beaches; see also Figure 1B). As a result, most of the variance in 
35 response magnitude in scene-selective areas is shared across models: Venn diagram 
36 
37 colors indicate variance explained by each model and their combinations, and grey 
38 
39 shows shared variance across all three models. Adapted, with permission, from [125]. 
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Outstanding Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
Outstanding Questions Box 
 To what extent are a combination of properties that facilitate a single goal (e.g., edges 
for scene recognition), generalizable to other tasks (e.g., edges for navigation)? 
 To what extent do co-occurring features within a scene category interact, or contribute 
independently to scene understanding? 
 Can multiple visual goals be carried out simultaneously, or do they interfere with each 
other? If simultaneously, can a single property be used for multiple purposes or can 
simultaneous goals occur when they require different features? If they interfere, is a 
new internal representation generated each time the goal momentarily changes? 
 Is the neural representation of scenes modulated by the degree of co-occurrence 
between different levels of description (e.g., do typical scene exemplars have higher 
consistency between features and therefore more reliable neural representations?) 
 What is the nature of the stored representation that a recognized scene is matched 
with? Is it based on physical characteristics or a set of rules? Does this change with 
recognized hierarchical level of detail? 
 How do the representations in scene-selective cortex compare with the representations 
in other regions implicated in navigation, such as hippocampus and entorhinal cortex? 
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